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What shows that the spherical body is the best of all bodies is the fact that it 
does not perish and that it moves with the motion which precedes all motions, 
and also that it moves with it eternally and regularly. 
 
—Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Cosmos 
 
The shape of the heaven is of necessity spherical; for that is the shape most 
appropriate to its substance and also by nature primary. 
 
—Aristotle, De coelo II.4, 286b9–10 
 
And he [the Demiurge] bestowed on it the shape which was befitting and akin. 
Now for that Living Creature which is designed to embrace within itself all 
living creatures the fitting shape will be that which comprises within itself all 
the shapes there are; wherefore He wrought it into a round, in the shape of a 
sphere, equidistant in all directions from the center to the extremities, which of 
all shapes is the most perfect and the most self-similar. 
 
—Plato, Timaeus 33b 
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We live in a world of spheres. Within the larger system of the geosphere many subsystems 
unfold and entwine their material cycles—the hydrosphere and the atmosphere weave together 
with the more limited lithosphere and cryosphere. The biosphere, the “layer” of life and its 
cycles, has been complemented by mental and artificial spheres such as the Vernadskyian 
noosphere and the most successful newcomer, the technosphere. To be sure, we have to 
understand our modern spheres metaphorically, the sphere being the symbol of self-regulating 
closeness; and yet they stem from ancient visions that literally posited the existence of perfectly 
spherical bodies in nature. In this essay, I will reconstruct the ancient, cosmological roots of the 
very idea that stable natural processes can be understood as “cycles”. In fact, they were initially 
brought back into the circular motion of the perfectly spherical bodies of the heavens. 
 
The cosmological spheres of the ancient worldview were ethereal orbs deputed to transport 
stars and planets in circular motion. Thanks to their geometrical form they were allotted the 
divine privilege of eternal motion: “There is no continuous movement except movement in 
place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous”—Aristotle stated with crystalline 
clarity in the Metaphysics.1 Drawing on these premises, Aristotle’s followers saw the spherical 
shape as the precondition of circular motion, which they considered to be the only never-ending 
displacement in nature. In fact, its end coincides with its beginning. In the Latin Middle Ages, 
“sphaera” became then a synonym of the uppermost heaven, thought of as the starry boundary 
of the material world. According to theological conceptions still in circulation in the 
seventeenth century, the orb of “fixed” stars was embraced by the Empyreum, the immaterial 
seat of blessed souls, saints, and angels according to the hierarchical chain of beings that 
connects the lowest realm to God (Figure 1). 
                                                     
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.6, 1071b10–11, cf. Metaphysics, ed. C. D. C. Reeve. Cambridge, MA and 
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2016, p. 203. 
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Figure 1: The theological vision of a hierarchical universe culminating with God was still in circulation in the 
seventeenth century, as shown by this diagram taken from Robert Fludd, Microcosmi historia (Oppenhemii: De Bry, 
1619), p. 219. SLUB Dresden, collocation 1.B.3237-2 [online](http://digital.slub-dresden.de/werkansicht/dlf/4570/5/). 
 
One can hardly find a better representation of the material cosmos of concentric spheres than 
the diagram (Figure 2) that is often included in manuscripts and early editions of Johannes de 
Sacrobosco’s De sphaera (On the Sphere), the standard textbook on spherical astronomy in the 
art faculties of medieval and early modern universities. 2  At the beginning of his tract 
Sacrobosco introduced the Aristotelian distinction of “two physics,” sublunary and superlunary. 
                                                     
2 See Lynn Thorndike, The Sphere of Sacrobosco and its Commentators. Chicago, IL: Chicago 
University Press, 1949; and Michel-Pierre Lerner, Le Monde des spheres: Vol. 1, Genèse et triomphe 
d’une représentation cosmique; Vol. 2, La fin du cosmos classique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
1996–97. 
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While the heavens move according to the most perfect motion (that is, as we already know, in 
circles), the elements move in straight lines, upwards (air and fire) or downwards (water and 
earth), unless impeded from doing so by some occurrence or “violence.” In the diagrams that 
accompany these tracts, the highest sphere is that of the fixed stars; it encloses a series of lower 
planetary orbs, among them those transporting the Sun and, closest to us, the Moon. The 
sublunary realm occupies the innermost place and is partitioned in concentric spheres as well. 
The sublunary spherical partitions represent the so-called “natural places,” which the four 
elements incessantly aim to reach in accordance with their nature. These are: fire, air, water, 
and, at the center of the world and coincident with the center of gravity, the earth.  
 
Figure 2: Scheme of the medieval concentric-spheres cosmos from an early edition of Johannes de Sacrobosco, Tractatus 
de sphaera (Paris, Georg Mittelhus, 1493), f. A1v. Ludwig Maximilian Universität, München, signature: 4 Inc.lat. 
310#6.3 
 
A certain discrepancy between the geometrical scheme and reality is unavoidable since the 
elements often intermingle, the boundaries of their “natural places” are permeable, and their 
                                                     
3 Digital copy available [online](https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11720/), accessed December 18, 
2017. 
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contours are blurred. Ontological imprecision notwithstanding, cosmological diagrams 
continued to display four idealized elementary spheres throughout fifteenth and sixteenth 
century editions of De sphaera. The earth was often represented as a disc with the letter “T” 
engraved on it, this tau was the carrier of a geographical meaning as well as a theological one, 
as it signified the holy cross as well as the Mediterranean Sea dividing the world into three 
continents (Europe, Africa, Asia). At the time of the European conquest of America and the 
discovery of the “Antipodes” (people living upside down on the opposite side of the globe) it 
became evident that the mass of the land outside the oceans was not just a little earth cup, the 
limited orbis terrarum imagined by the ancient geographers; instead, continents were 
irregularly distributed all over the globe. In light of this discovery the earth ceased to be seen 
as an elementary sphere included in that of the waters, only partially emerging from the ocean 
thanks to a providential mismatch between the centers of the two spheres, it was now 
established that we inhabit an “earthly-watery globe” (a globus terraquaeus), the image of 
which appears in post-Columbian cosmological diagrams. These innovations notwithstanding, 
the general structure of the concentric-spheres cosmos was not about to be abandoned. Despite 
the emergence of the in(de)finite universe idea—e.g. in the post-Copernican conception of 
philosophers such as Giordano Bruno, René Descartes, and their followers4—the standard 
teaching of “celestial physics” remained as conveyed by Aristotle in De coelo (On the 
Heavens).5 Here, the heavenly and elementary spheres are approached one after the other (in 
books I–II and III–IV, respectively) according to their supposed physical contiguity and 
continuity. The world of the spheres lived on, long after alternative worldviews emerged. 
 
Yet, order does not imply motion. A disposition is not an explanation for motion just as the 
ascertainment of “structures” underlying the phenomena does not explain their dynamics, 
unless causes are introduced to account for the genesis and persistence of systemic processes.6 
In De generatione et corruptione (On Coming to Be and Passing Away), a work devoted to 
generation, life, and death, Aristotle raised the crucial question (II, 337a8–11): “what is to some 
people a baffling problem—viz. why the simple bodies [the elements], since each of them is 
travelling towards its own place, have not become dissevered from each another in the infinite 
                                                     
4 Pietro Daniel Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance: Reception, Legacy, 
Transformation, Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy and Science, vol. 23. Leiden: Brill, 2014, 
chapter 4. 
5 Aristotle, On the Heavens (De coelo), in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 
1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 447–511. 
6 Jean Piaget, Le structuralisme. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970/1968. 
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lapse of time.”7 Why does the world not come to a standstill? What is the reason for the stability 
of such terrestrial cycles ranging from material transformations to life processes? Such 
questions concern the genesis, endurance, and even goals of the spheres; it is, in one word, the 
quest for causes, including teleological ones. This intuition can be seen as the structural 
inception or, rather, as the premodern basis of the later, metaphorical usage of the term 
“spheres.” It refers to their main feature—i.e. recurrent dynamic stability—and implies related 
questions about what causes the material and life cycles in nature, and the question of what 
keeps them going. In this respect natural philosophers from the Latin Middle Ages 
distinguished between the so-called “quia,”—the observed cyclic phenomena seen as facts—
and the “propter quid,” their causes. Each should be taken into account for a sound explanation 
of nature.  
 
A tentative answer to the question about the causes of natural cycles can be found in Aristotle’s 
elementary doctrine; such doctrine occupies a key position in his natural philosophy. It is 
addressed in the second part of De coelo and in the two books of De generatione et corruptione, 
functioning to connect the general theory of motion and of the heavens in Physics and De coelo 
I–II with the explanation of meteorological phenomena specifically expounded in the 
Meteorologica. Aristotle characterized the corporeal elements as couples of opposite tactile 
qualities: heat and coldness, wetness and dryness, of which he admitted only four combinations. 
Moreover, he did not see the elements as stable. According to him they are constantly 
intermixed, transforming into one another. These conversions are not the effect of an internal 
impetus; he posited external causes which produce specific qualities by their action on prime 
matter (the universal material substrate). These causes are heavenly: the displacement of the 
Sun along the ecliptic is the proper cause of material and life cycles, while the steady, daily 
motion of the heavens around the poles of the world is the source of continuity for the sublunary 
processes.8  
 
The celestial origin of terrestrial cycles was to become a stock medieval argument in favor of 
astrology, seen at the time as the science of heavenly influences. The solar causation of seasonal 
changes was equated to the lunar causation of tidal movements in reference works such as 
                                                     
7 Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, in W. D. Ross (ed.), The Student’s Oxford Aristotle, vol. 2. 
London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1942. 
8 This cosmological idea, expounded in De generatione et corruptione is repeated at a higher level of 
abstraction in Metaphysics XII. 
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Albumasar’s Introductorium in astronomiam [Introduction to Astronomy]. 9  Solar–lunar 
conjunctions and oppositions accounted for the ebb and the flow, regarded as the effect of a 
cosmic sympathy between the waters and the Moon—an occult, distant action that bears more 
resemblance to Newtonian gravitation theory than to the mechanical explanations of Galileo 
and Descartes. 
 
Hence, in order to trace the origin of terrestrial cyclic phenomena such as seasonal change, the 
Copernicans—just like the Aristotelians—lifted their eyes in search of astronomical causes. 
Still, cosmological causation does not solve the problem of the origin of motion in the world 
system, but only shifts it, for two reasons. Firstly, even celestial phenomena are not as regular 
as the principle of perfect circularity assumes. Secondly, their causes have to be detected, as 
well.  
 
Early fifteenth-century celestial physics in Europe was marked by the convergent reception of 
two Islamic authors who envisaged a solution to the incongruity between the axiom of circular 
motion and observed phenomena. Ibn Rushd (Averroes) in his most celebrated commentaries 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics and al-Bitruji (Alpetragius) in Planetarum theorica physicis 
rationibus probate (Planetary Theory Demonstrated Through Physical Proof) envisaged a 
program of “physical mathematics” aimed at tracing all astronomical phenomena back to sets 
of circular motions produced by the motion of concentric ethereal spheres. Aristotelians of the 
Padua School such as Girolamo Fracastoro and Giovanni Battista Amico were particularly 
receptive to these theoretical debates. It was argued that the continuity of the circular motion in 
the ethereal spheres had to be secured through “cosmo-psychological” considerations as well 
as metaphysical principles.10 They assumed that celestial bodies were “ensouled”; moved by an 
intellectual desire for the divine. The Aristotelian God, the “Immobile Mover” toward which 
all natural beings strive, constituted the transcendent principle that secured the functioning and 
endurance of the cosmic machinery. 
 
In spite of his ambitious attempt to connect causal and mathematical reasoning, there were 
major shortcomings in the homocentric approach from its inception. Mathematical astronomers, 
                                                     
9 Albumasar, Introductorium in astronomiam. Venice: Sessa, 1506, ff. a3r-v.  
10 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 2001; Ibn Rushd (Averroes), De substantia orbis. Critical edition of the 
Hebrew text, with English trans. by Arthur Hyman. Cambridge, MA, and Jerusalem: Medieval 
Academy of America, 1986. 
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including Nicolaus Copernicus, objected to the idea that the eccentric and intersecting 
geometrical devices of the mathematical–astronomical tradition were indispensable to model 
planetary motions, and thus no concentric spheres could be assumed as leading hypotheses for 
astronomical inquiry. In fact, epicyclical models—characterized both by their eccentricity with 
respect to the cosmological center and by the nesting of circles on circles—accounted, among 
other things, for planets’ retrograde motions, elongations, and varying distances (Figure 3). 
How could a model of concentric spheres satisfactorily account for these phenomena, and 
particularly the varying distances of celestial bodies? Contrary to the homocentrists, 
mathematical-astronomers who followed in the footsteps of Ptolemy offered a different 
reconciliation of planetary modeling with the material spheres of the Aristotelian tradition. As 
has been argued, widespread graphic representations of epicyclical models in the standard 
sources of Renaissance planetary theory represent the ethereal bodies of the celestial spheres as 
black ink discs; they encircle the mathematical devices of Ptolemaic astronomers. In this 
manner, one can visualize the planets, transported by Ptolemaic circlets, without transgressing 
the boundaries of their orbs in the stratigraphy of the onion-like cosmos of concentric spheres 
(as can be observed in many editions of Georg Peuerbach’s Theorica novae planetarum, that 
is, New Planetary Theories, such as in the diagram reproduced as Figure 4, below). 
 
Figure 3: Ptolemaic devices for the modeling of planetary motions, from Gregor Reisch, Margarita philosophica VII, 1 
(Strassbourg: Johannes Grüninger, 1508). Library of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science  
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Figure 3: A planetary diagram from a Renaissance edition of Georg Peuerbach’s Theoricae novae planetarum 
(Wittenberg: Lufft, 1542), in which the embedment of the Ptolemaic eccentrics and epicycles in a sphere is evidenced 
with black ink. Library of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science. 
During the sixteenth century the cosmos of celestial spheres entered an irreversible crisis after 
it was established that comet trajectories are located outside the sublunary realm and thus freely 
travel across a fluid cosmic space. Among Renaissance astronomers, Tycho Brahe was the most 
authoritative critic of the existence of orbs, which he rejected on the basis of the observations 
and computations relative to the comet of 1577. Not long after him, the fluidity of the heavens 
became the consensus among many astronomers. Hence, the urgent question arose of how to 
explain planetary motions after the spheres vanished. The theoretical vacuum left by the ban on 
the old causal explanation fueled research and eventually led to the novel celestial physics of 
Johannes Kepler and Isaac Newton. In passages from Alexander Koyré’s (1957) From the 
Closed World to the Infinite Universe (or better put in context: “From the World of Celestial 
Spheres to that of Fluid Space”) the concept of the sphere, as referred to natural processes, 
 10 
could only survive as a metaphor.11 The concrete materiality of spherical bodies that had 
previously accounted for cycles was abandoned without renouncing the idea of the circular 
recurrence of phenomena in nature. William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of blood 
offered a new model that could serve for the interpretation of natural processes in functional 
terms (according to his own form of revised Aristotelianism), for contemporary vistas in 
Renaissance vitalism or for later mechanic physiologies and philosophies.  
 
 
My final remark concerns anthropology. The question addressing the place of humankind 
accompanied astronomy and had particular relevance in the economy of classical cosmologies. 
Philosophical sources and astronomical literature from the Renaissance period assumed that a 
structural correspondence between man and the cosmos existed. The human microcosm was 
represented at the center of Creation and regarded as the copula mundi, the universal link of 
nature connecting the inferior reality with the loftier spheres, and the material with the 
supernatural (Figure 5). 
                                                     
11 Alexander Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1957. 
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Figure 5: This image, taken from Robert Fludd, Microcosmi historia (1619), p. 93, visualizes the cosmo-anthropological 
issue, the question about the place of humanity in the cosmos of concentric spheres. SLUB Dresden, collocation 
1.B.3237-2 [online](http://digital.slub-dresden.de/werkansicht/dlf/4570/5/). 
 
Renaissance anthropocentrism pitted human freedom against natural necessity. The world was 
the stable stage for our actions and choices. The heavenly spheres accomplished their 
revolutions in the background, setting the stage for the drama of history. The foundations of 
that exterior world, either eternal or created during the six days of Genesis, were metaphysical 
and theological. Dynamic conceptions of physics and biology would eventually discard that 
static image of nature. However, it is only with the most recent debates concerning the 
Anthropocene that the modern separation of human action and natural settings has been 
overcome in consideration of the fact that the technosphere has emerged in a historical time. In 
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this manner, the continuity between nature and human history, which was often assumed with 
vitalistic conceptions at the threshold of modernity, has been revived from a different 
viewpoint. 
 
The Anthropocene debate reveals human collective practices as the cause of the emergence of 
fundamental global transformations, and their dynamic stability. Unlike its ancient and 
medieval predecessors the technosphere cannot rest on extra-human foundations, therefore its 
autonomy as a self-regulating system is threatened by the fragility of our biological species, 
whose survival is endangered by the global dynamics it has set in motion.  
 
Technology is the first geological paradigm complex enough to become aware, 
through its human components, of the essential contribution to its own existence 
of the support provided by established paradigms. Whether this awareness will 
lead to the conservation of a sufficient quantity of natural capital to maintain 
technological function (and thus the well-being of humans) is the basic question 
of environmental science. The answer to this question may also determine 
whether or not the technosphere will, in the long run, become an established 
rather than a failed geological paradigm.12  
 
Evidently the maintenance of the technosphere and the survival of humanity are interlocked. 
Both ultimately depend on our capacity to harmonize culture and nature, to express the problem 
in classical terms. If this task is not achieved, the Anthropocene will not mean the beginning of 
the geological age of humankind but rather the opposite, an age that comes after the short season 
in which humankind populated the world. In this light, the Anthropocene proves to be a “task” 
of collective relevance and, as such, it is political in its essence. In fact, the technical solution 
can only be addressed from the perspective of a science and humanity emancipated from the 
anarchy of the present-day economy and from the logic of destruction that accompanies the 
scientific-technological development that is often assumed transcendent to us. 13  The 
stabilization of our spheres of life is in our hands, as they cannot be secured through 
metaphysical principles anymore. The Anthropocene predicament calls for political and 
                                                     
12 Peter K. Haff, “Technology as a Geological Phenomenon: Implications for Human Well-Being,” in 
Colin N. Walters et al., A Stratigraphical Basis for the Anthropocene. London: Geological Society 
Special Publications, vol. 395, 2014, pp. 301–09, here 304–05. 
13 Pietro Daniel Omodeo, “The Politics of Apocalypse: The Immanent Transcendence of 
Anthropocene,” Stvar: Časopis za teorijske prakse/Journal for Theoretical Practices, 9 (2017): 
433-449. 
 13 
cultural action aimed at mobilizing the technical and ethical means necessary to stabilize the 
spheres of the human-made world. 
 
